MARINE CORPS AIR STATION MIRAMAR, Calif. -- Do you remember the Son Tay Raid, an incredibly significant covert operation of the Vietnam War?
Although the Son Tay Raid may not be at the forefront of the recollection of the more recent generations, the Son Tay Raid was described by Mike McKinney, co-author of the 2001 book, "Chariots of the Damned," as a special operations raid that "stands out above all as the best example of flawless planning, preparation and execution."
By early 1970 there were several hundred American prisoners of war being held in North Vietnam, and in May 1970 it was confirmed that POWs were being held in a camp near Son Tay.
Reconnaissance flights by SR-71 Blackbirds discovered the POWs, and also pointed out that while the camp was only 23 miles northwest of Hanoi, the area was isolated and desolate. Conditions for the POWs were poor.
Initial planning to rescue POWs was underway in June 1970. It was found that POWs of the camp were sending signals to help develop a rescue strategy, but Army Brig. Gen. Donald Blackburn, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, who worked directly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had an idea of his own. He decided that while the POWs suggestive signals of a rescue around Mount Ba Vi, where groups of POWs were often sent in working parties, would have a high chance for success, he thought an operation should be made to crash-land into the prison and rescue all the POWs rather than a few.
Soon after a feasibility study group of 15 men committed to the plan, Air Force Brig. Gen. Leroy Manor was selected as the overall commander for the mission. Manor, at the time, was the commander of U.S. Air Force Special Operations forces at Eglin Air Force Base. The outcome of the operation was ultimately his responsibility.
To start planning, a window of perfect opportunity had to be decided on. The raid would take place at night - the skies had to be clear for air refueling, there would have to be little to no wind or turbulence in the mountains, one-third to one-quarter moon, and 35 degrees above the horizon to provide the necessary visibility. The best window of opportunity was around Oct. 21, but preparation and political blockades eventually pushed the operation back to the second window of opportunity, and the raid would take place the night of Nov. 20.
Between the time of the initial planning and the operation date, preparation was precise. Manor would take less than five months before the operation to recruit and train the rescue force. Most of the force came from the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, which "were the only helicopter crews that routinely penetrated deep inside North Vietnam to rescue downed airmen. Their training was optimized for this mission and better yet, so too were their helicopters," according to McKinney. Twenty-eight helicopter air crewmen volunteered for the mission, and the pilots were two captains, six majors and four lieutenant colonels.
The pilots who were selected to train for the raid were noted as "some of the most experienced pilots in the Air Force," and some were more notable than others. One, for instance, was Air Force Maj. Frederic Donohue, who was a veteran of more than 130 combat missions in theater. Another pilot was Air Force Lt. Col. Herbert Zehnder, who had set a world record in 1967 by flying an HH-3E non-stop from Brooklyn Naval Air Station, N.Y., to the Paris Air Show - 4,157 miles.
The training was divided into steps. The exercises were simple at first and gradually intensified to prepare the men for Son Tay. Helicopter crews worked on formation procedures, familiarization with dissimilar aircraft, weaponry and landing scenarios until every given situation that could arise during the operation was covered to perfection, as McKinney described.
"The final phase of training put all the pieces together, as the raiders and helicopter crews practiced every contingency. With only two weeks left until the first launch window, one final piece to the puzzle remained - the elimination of two guard towers on the wall surrounding the prison. The raiders could not place enough rounds on target in the initial assault to ensure that the guards in the towers wouldn't jeopardize the mission. The only option was to use the firepower of the HH-53s. Major Donohue and Captain Thomas Waldron were chosen to act as a gunship and fly between the towers while their crew in the back, Staff Sergeant Aron Hodges, Staff Sergeant James Rogers and Staff Sergeant Angus Sowell, engaged the towers with their 7.62mm miniguns. With firing speeds up to 4,000 rounds per minute, the three miniguns would shred the guard towers in seconds. This was a very risky maneuver because of the proximity to the POWs quarters. There could be no margin for error as the chance of injuring the POWs was too great. Even after all the intense preparation, very few people in the force knew of the exact target. Because of the numerous hours of over water flight, many of the helicopter crews were convinced they were going to launch an attack on Cuba. In the end, the assault force conducted 170 rehearsals of the mission, totaling over 280 sorties and 790 flight hours. They were honed to a razor-sharp edge and ready for action."
The mission started at 11:18 p.m., Nov. 20, 1970, when the first HH-53C, codenamed Apple 1, lifted from Udorn Air Base in Thailand. The operation involved HH-53Cs, one HH-3E, A-1 Skyraiders, MC-130E Combat Talons, and HC-130P tankers. At about 1:15 a.m. the helicopters refueled once more before meeting the MC-130 Combat Talon that would use its navigational systems to lead the force to Son Tay through the mountains and valleys of North Vietnam.
"As the flight emerged from the foothills in North Vietnam, the lights of Hanoi could be seen glowing in the distance," McKinney continued. "This was the time when the mission was most vulnerable. The planners had gone to considerable lengths to analyze the North Vietnamese early warning radar coverage and to choose the best route."
Everything had been going as planned until the mission ran into a "glaring error." The formation had gone toward the wrong objective, a compound 400 yards south that resembled Son Tay. However, they realized the mistake at the last second and turned north. The force succeeded at entering the compound and destroying the two guard towers. Everyone eventually got into place and were ready to complete the evacuation of the "70-80 ill-nourished, weak and sick POWs" intelligence had reported. There was one problem though; there were no POWs to be evacuated. The raiders evacuated themselves and flew back home "completely demoralized." They were sure members of intelligence had "really screwed up this time." However, the POWs were at Son Tay, but were relocated in July to another camp a few miles away. While the main objective of retrieving POWs was not met, McKinney concluded that the mission was a staggering success in many other ways.
"While on the surface, the Son Tay raid seems like a complete failure, it did have some unseen effects," McKinney wrote. "The North Vietnamese feared another raid and congregated all of the POWs into two camps in Hanoi. This allowed the POWs to communicate among one another, increasing morale. As the story of the raid circulated among the POWs, told by those who had witnessed it, they realized their country had not forgotten them. Finally, the North Vietnamese began taking better care of the POWs, again fearing reprisals. What the Son Tay raiders had done was truly remarkable. They planned, rehearsed and executed a daring special operations mission, deep in the heart of enemy territory. Their goal was the noblest of all, to rescue fellow countrymen held against their will. The lessons of the Son Tay raid are still echoed today in special operations training; a mission properly planned and practiced can succeed even under the most demanding conditions."